In trying to argue against the possibility of a secular ethics, Jewish Philosopher stumbles over a classic mistake:

Obviously, there is no “natural” morality. If there is no universal, eternal lawgiver then there is no universal, eternal law.

Anybody who’s ready Plato’ Euthyphro will immediately see the fallacy here. In fact, it’s not a mistake limited to philosophers of religion. Legal realists and positivists are often guilty of the same. But since Jewish Philosopher is trying to make a point about religion, we’ll stick to that for now.

The problem is as follows. Let’s assume that there is indeed no ethical law without a lawgiver. What is my obligation to obey the lawgiver? If you say it is because the lawgiver is God, who created the world and gave Israel the Torah, you walk right into a logical dilemma. How can I have an obligation to obey the lawgiver if my basic ethical obligations only kick in with the command itself?

Fortunately, the rabbis were better philosophers than so-called Jewish Philosopher. The fundamental Jewish answer to the question ‘why obey the lawgiver’ is found in the 13 Attributes of Mercy (Ex. 34:6-7). In short, God embodies goodness and thus imitating Him is imitating goodness. In order for divine goodness to validate, as it does, divine authority, we must take for granted that the quality of goodness itself precedes the divine command.

This is to say that divine authority cannot logically be identical to the specific command itself. It follows, then, that goodness - which ultimately generates that authority - is ontologically independent of the divine command.