We should take notice of any legal action that limits freedom of expression, even if it turns out to be justified. Libel and slander laws, for instance, explicitly limit free speech and that shouldn’t be taken lightly. It’s justified, not because free speech doesn’t apply, but rather because the negative externalities of limitless libel and slander outweigh other considerations.
The anti-Holocaust-denial legislation that helped convict David Irving should be viewed in this light. The question isn’t whether or not it violates free speech (of course it does). It’s whether or not allowing public Holocaust-denying is better.
From what I can tell, the discussion over Irving’s conviction seems to be about censorship in general. Alonzo Fyfe argues:
[C]ounter-words are the only legitimate response to the claims that David Irving made. Responding to his words with violence (including the violence of state-imposed punishment) is no different that Muslims responding to the Mohammed cartoons with violence.
Jim Lindgren writes similarly:
I don’t think that holocaust denial… should be a crime… [T]he cartoon riots have confirmed and strengthened this opinion. The Imams are right to point to the inconsistency in European treatment between holocaust denial and blasphemy against Mohammed.
The comparison with the Danish anti-Muslim cartoons misses a crucial difference. Holocaust denial conjures up an image of violence. It has been and continues to be used by anti-Semites to rally against Jews and against Israel. It should come as no surprise that Arab countries that deny Israel’s right to exist and sponsor terrorism against it, regularly support claims that Jews exaggerated the Holocaust for political purposes.
This is not the case regarding the Mohammed cartoons. Although a negative reaction from the Muslim world was surely expected, there is no particular violence against Muslims that the cartoons represent. I think it’s reasonable to distinguish between the two on these grounds. Holocaust denial is clearly associated with violence against Jews and thus, qualifies as incitement. In countries where this is especially true (i.e. Austria) I think legislation criminalizing it is justified.
The options here are between outlawing a particular point of view and refuting it. If we pass legislation saying, “You cannot say that X is true,” this gives people no reason to believe that X is false. A great many laws like this have done nothing but create forbidden proof.
Yet, if the government and private entities take the claim to task and refute it — devoting time and resources, for example, to making sure that school children and other citizens see the evidence that the claim is true; as well as morally condemn those who engage in shoddy scholarship to support a doctrine of hate — then the people are given reason to disbelieve the claim.
Comment by AlonzoFyfe — February 23, 2006 @ 7:43 am
The two aren’t mutually exclusive. Poor scholarship should still be condemned and school children should still learn about the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The fact is, though, that Holocaust denial is incitement and has been used that way. Laws against incitement are regularly held up in courts and are considered uncontroversial.
Comment by sagoboulevard — February 23, 2006 @ 12:00 pm