One of the classic difficulties of social contract theories is their reliance on obviously ficticious accounts that overemphasize the role of consent in the creation of states. I was thinking about this the other night while watching Seinfeld (”The Limo“):

George: Excuse me, sir, do you have the time?

Man: There’s a clock over there.

George: Where?

Man (pointing): There.

George: But you have a watch on.

Man: It’s right by the escalator.

George: Why don’t you just look at your watch?

Man: I told you, it’s right over there.

George: Let me see the watch.

George grabs the man’s wrist.

Man: Hey! What are you, some kind of nut?!

George: You know we’re living in a society!

The watch-wearing stranger perhaps believes that basic social norms do not apply to him unless he freely chooses to enter into an arrangement with his neighbors, whereby each individual surrenders some of his rights in exchange for certain protections. Yet, George informs him otherwise, that despite his seemingly lack of consent, he does in fact live in a society. It cannot be only by virture of our consent that our actions affect those around us. Our mere existence affects our parents, for example. This doesn’t rule out the possibilty of consent justifying certain kinds of coercion but it does call into question the picture of wholly free individuals in a pre-society state of nature.