I linked to the Swinburne-Dennett exchange in a previous post. Jeremy Pierce, at Prosblogion, points out an interesting move that Swinburne makes in response to the so-called multiverse theory. Typically, the multiverse theory is used to rebut a version of the argument from design that points to the fine-tuning of the constants of nature. Here, Swinburne offers what Pierce calls a “meta-teleological argument”:
Some sort of multiverse theory might well be true. My point was that if there is a multiverse, it’s a multiverse of a kind which will produce at least one universe which will produce humans. But it’s logically possible that there might instead have been other quite different kinds of multiverse, or just one universe, not productive of humans. So why are the most general laws of the multiverse as they are? Why do all particles behave in exactly the same way as each other, so as together ultimately to produce human life? This enormous coincidence in particle behaviour requires explaining.