Vegetarianism poses an interesting challenge from a philosophical perspective because it forces the moral theorist to distinguish, on a fundamental level, between human and non-human animals. As far as I know, nobody (even PETA) argues that non-human animals (hereafter “animals”) deserve the same treatment as human beings. On one hand, raising the moral status of animals makes it more difficult to justify such an innocuous practice as owning a pet. I assume most pet-owners would oppose reinstituing the slave trade. Yet, most of us instinctively recoil at the thought of brutally tortuing animals for pleasure.
In this context, Rik Hine’s argument for vegetarianism is refreshing (even if unsound) because it appreciates the ambiguity involved. Taking a page from William James, he argues that “the debate about eating non-human animals is living, momentous and forced.” Despite the fact that, as he concedes, we can’t render a verdict regarding the moral status of animals, we ought to refrain from eating them anyway. In a Pascal-style argument, Hine suggests that we put ourselves in the shoes of a gambler.
(1) If we continue to eat meat when it’s a live option that this might be immoral and it turns out, in fact, to be the case, then we have committed a serious moral wrong.
(2) If, on the other hand, we decide to stop eating meat and it turns out to be morally permissible then the worst harm we have committed is to deprive ourselves of a particular gustatory pleasure.
(3) If we continue to eat meat and it is morally permissible then nothing of ethical significance rests on this result, and likewise,
(4) if we refrain from eating meat when continuing would be unethical, then we have simply acted as we ought to.
…
It seems to me, ultimately, that the issue can be reduced to the potential harms proposed in (1) and (2). The severity of the respective harms, in this case, are so clearly asymmetric that we would be simply astonished if the gambler placed his chips on (1). Analogously, then, I would conclude that unless or until we are epistemologically able to access a definitive answer about the actual moral status of killing non-human animals, we are in the same position and, as in (2), we should cease to eat meat.
The obvious advantage of this argument is in its determining the relevant ethical behavior without taking a definite stand on the moral status of animals. It’s important to note, though, that Hine doesn’t conclude that eating meat is immoral but rather that we should refrain from eating meat because it might be. But are we morally obligated to refrain from activities that merely might be immoral? And if so, what is the significance of something that “might be immoral” if it’s immediately transformed into flat-out “immoral”? In the case of eating meat the possible offense is even more indirect. The meat-eater is merely benefitting from a possibly immoral activity. Even if I accept Hine’s assumption that one is obligated to refrain from possibly immoral activities, it would be too weak an obligation to extend to eating meat in general.
Enjoyed your post, Sago (if that’s your name! not really sure…) Let me see if I can muster a response. I am troubled by Rik’s argument for the precise reason that you are, so this should make for an interesting exercise.
Perhaps one could respond in the following way: of course, anything might be immoral, and you are absolutely correct to denounce this as a reason for refraining from action. It must be admitted as a possibility that it is immoral to wear orange on Tuesdays, but that just isn’t a good enough reason for me to refrain from the practice. What is needed is some evidence that it is not completely ridiculous to think that wearing orange on Tuesdays is wrong.
Of course, in the example I’ve used it is completely ridiculous, but in other cases it is not. Consider some putative moral issues: is it wrong to keep slaves? Yes! Do we have an obligation to protect the rights of women and ethinic minorities? Yes! Is it permissible to voice your political or religious opinion insofar as it does not harm others? Yes! Is it permissible to maturbate? Yes! Is it immoral to wear orange on Tuesdays? Of course not! Is abortion permissible? Hmm…
The last question is of the interesting moral variety. You might consider this the “gray area” where live moral issues are fostered and ruminated over. There is no doubt that some moral issues are, for all intents and purposes, settled. There are also amoral issues, like the question of what color clothing you should wear. But the gray area of morality is where argumentation only gets us so far, because intuition and evidence do not combine in such a way as to clearly settle the question on one side of the debate or the other.
This is where the Pascal-style wager argument comes into play. Set up a decision matrix, using whatever methods are appropriate for this task, and then act conservatively. Take the course of action that brings with it the least risk of acting immorally. This seems like a pretty rational thing to advise for such situations.
If you accept this response, then the only concern that remains for any particular question is: does it fall into a black or white moral category? is it an amoral subject? or does it fall into the moral gray area? Since the question of the treatment of non-human animals seems to definitely fall into that gray area, it is well advised that we should not eat meat. That is the conservative thing to do - the thing that puts us in the least risky position with respect to acting immorally.
Comment by Colin Caret — April 17, 2006 @ 8:53 pm
To me (a vegetarian) it is a fairly simple thought process. Animals are alive and are able to feel pain. By killing them, we are inflicting pain on a living being. While I’m not proclaiming a moral judgement on doing this, I don’t feel very good about it.
As recently as 30 years ago, it was far more difficult to eat an healthy, filling diet without meat. I certainly think that the human need for nutrition outweights the feelings of animals. But, if someone can fill their food needs without harming animals, that is a better choice.
Comment by dbs — April 18, 2006 @ 12:54 am
dbs - You’re approach is overly simplistic. First of all, you can kill an animals without causing pain. Secondly, if killing animals is morally equivalent to murder, why would it matter whether or not it is difficult to maintain a healthy diet?
Comment by sagoboulevard — April 18, 2006 @ 7:00 pm
I would say that dbs’s argument, is not something to be immediately dismissed. While it will not provide a theoretical answer to the morality of meat-eating, if one accepts that one should at the very least refrain from causing pain and suffering in the process of meat-consumption then nearly ALL of current meat-eating is immediately ruled out. There is hardly any–I would hazard that really the answer is that there there is absolutely zero–practice of meat-eating that is suffering and pain free. dbs’s argument then is far from simplistic in that it should have a dramatic effect on our actual practices and lifestyle–if we accept that causing animals suffering is wrong. So maybe we don’t get a satifying theoretical answer, but we don’t get to dismiss it either.
Comment by Ben Miller — April 20, 2006 @ 11:52 pm
sago,
I’m actually not making a ‘moral’ argument, since I think that one must limit the definition of morality to how humanity acts towards itself. We can make the statement that all humans exist of an equal plane of humanity, and may not be treated as a sub-human. However, with other species, there can be no such sweeping characterization.
It would be immoral to allow a human to starve because we are unwilling to kill an animal. Conversely, killing an animal for fun or sport may not be immoral, but I certainly would be cautious about that persons’ compassion (or being Vice President).
As for the ability to kill animals without pain, I think that this certainly may be true theoretically, but it is very far from how the beef industry operates today.
Overall, I’m just saying what I am comfortable with. I’ve got a soft spot for living things and I hate seeing them in pain. If I can enjoy what I eat without killing, it seems much better to me.
Comment by dbs — April 21, 2006 @ 3:15 pm
The 29th Philosophers’ Carnival
The great Library at Daylight Atheism has been outfitted for an auspicious occasion. Merry bunting drapes the tall shelves of books, balloons congregate near the ceiling, and waiters quietly circulate bearing trays of drinks. Already the symposium is i…
Trackback by Daylight Atheism — May 1, 2006 @ 7:49 pm
Your response has some merit David, but I think it needs work. Most obviously, there are many cases where /possibly/ bad acts are treated as forbidden: If I point a gun at you and point the trigger, it isn’t /certain/ that you’ll be hit (the gun could jam, I could miss, etc.). But that doesn’t change the fact that my aiming a gun at you and firing is a bad act.
In general, I think its bound to be a matter of degree: Is there an alternative act available with less chance of being immoral? How great is the chance of this act being immoral? And, I think, Hine’s argument is intended to show that there’s some chance of carnivorism (?) being /very/ immoral, and some chance of it being just /mildly/ pleasurable. I think its plausible to suggest that this act has a great enough chance of being bad to render it immoral.
Comment by Alex Gregory — May 2, 2006 @ 2:57 am
Alex,
You aiming a gun and firing at me isn’t a bad act because it might kill me. It’s a bad act because you’re trying to kill me. The purpose of your act would be to kill me. Probability shouldn’t a play a role there.
One of the problems with Hine’s argument is that there’s no mechanism for determining what the probability is. True, it might be “very” immoral but how are we to understand the nature of “might be”?
Comment by sagoboulevard — May 2, 2006 @ 12:56 pm
Can I just say that the human anatomy functions in such a way as to imply that meat eating is a fundamental part of our ability to live. Look at the construction of our jaw, the teeth in our skull, and our digestive system, they are all “designed” (for lack of a better word) to process meat protiens, and infact, protien is a very important part of the human diet. Wether or not meat eating is moral or immoral is moot by way of our anatomy.
But then, I guess that’s not a very philosophical answer.
Comment by montu — May 4, 2006 @ 7:59 pm
“On one hand, raising the moral status of animals makes it more difficult to justify such an innocuous practice as owning a pet. I assume most pet-owners would oppose reinstituing the slave trade.”
Surely pets are more like adopted children than they are like slaves. (You think your cat is your slave? Boy, have you got things back to front!) Adopting non-humans and making it possible for them to live flourishing lives seems quite compatible with ascribing a significant moral status to them.
“We can make the statement that all humans exist of an equal plane of humanity, and may not be treated as a sub-human. However, with other species, there can be no such sweeping characterization.”
Why not? This whole Pascal-type argument rests on the premise that the moral status of animals is a grey area. But for many of us, the argument for ascribing rights or equal consideration is just as strong in the case of dogs and pigs as it is in the case of human children or the mentally handicapped. Of course, no humans should be treated as sub-human. Good thinking. But then, no dogs should be treated as sub-canine, right? A more relevant point is that many dogs and pigs are smarter and more emotionally sophisticated than some humans.
“Can I just say that the human anatomy functions in such a way as to imply that meat eating is a fundamental part of our ability to live.”
You can say it, but it’s a dumb thing to say. Our closest non-human relatives are either entirely or mostly vegetarian. The main thing, however, is that humans can survive with or without meat in their diet (though most people would probably be healthier with little or no meat), so we have a CHOICE to make, and this makes the issue a moral one.
Comment by mijnheer — May 7, 2006 @ 4:24 am